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THE CASE FOR TEACHING JAPANESE LAW AT
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
Kenneth L. Port*
Teaching Japanese law in American law schools may not cur-
rently rank as the single most important curriculum need to be fil-
led, but as the relationship between the United States and Japan
becomes increasingly complex and "legal" in nature, real knowledge
of (not just exposure to) Japanese systems, including the legal sys-
tem, will be an absolute necessity for any attorney engaged in a
sophisticated practice in the United States. Furthermore, for any
law student, comparing the role of law in any given society can be
enlightening. In this age of creeping student consumerism, it is even
more fundamental that law professors continue to push students to
think the unthinkable and learn the apparently unlearnable. It is
through such a process that a student's mind grows, which in turn
develops the student's ability to think creatively and develop new
methods of problem-solving.1 Toward these ends, studying Japanese
law is unquantifiably beneficial.
Americans have been slow to give the Japanese legal system the
serious study it deserves.' Although many schools dedicate signifi-
cant resources to the study of Japan, Japanese law is taught on a
regular basis at only a few law schools.3 In fact, it is difficult for
some educators to even conceive of the relevance of teaching and
studying a system they perceive to be radically different from their
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology; effective Fall of 1994, Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
B.A., Macalester College, 1982; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1989. The author is also the editor
of The Role of Law and the Legal Process in Japan, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Electronic
Casebook, 1994. The author would like to thank Brian Saucier ('94) for his excellent research
assistance and Professors David Gerber and Hiro Ito for reading and commenting on an earlier
draft of this article.
1. Anthony D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumer-
ism, 37 J. LEGAL EDUc. 461, 471 (1987).
2. So have most comparativists as well. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing how, until recently, comparativists inappropriately lumped Japan's legal system together with
those of other Asian countries).
3. Although this list is not inclusive, law schools at the University of Chicago, the University of
Washington, UCLA, and Boston University all offer regular courses in Japanese law.
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own.
Americans should keep in mind that the Japanese have been stud-
ying the United States's legal system, markets, business systems,
distribution networks, product requirements, and consumer prefer-
ences for forty-five years. The Japanese are now able to sell high-
quality products in the United States at reasonable prices, beating
their American competitors at their own game in the Americans'
backyard. If U.S. corporations expect to ever truly "open" Japanese
markets, the very first step is to gain knowledge and understanding
of those markets and the elements which make them work. For law-
yers, there is no better place to start than by studying the Japanese
legal system.
The major stumbling block in this pursuit is the current trend in
the United States to be either a "Japan basher" or, at the polar
opposite, a complete "Japan sympathizer." The Japan basher spends
a significant amount of time and energy pointing out the negative
results of American business contacts with Japan. The Japan basher
emphasizes how Japanese law may appear to be facially neutral but
is applied to favor the Japanese, how the Japanese protect their own
and are hostile to Americans, and how the Japanese distribution
system is so complicated and intertwined with the keiretsu system4
that an American corporation has no chance of success.
The Japan sympathizer, on the other hand, is usually forced into
the defensive and spends time and energy defending Japan. The
sympathizer points out how some American companies (such as
4. The Japanese keiretsu, or "corporate conglomerate," is a system of interrelating corporations
generally organized around one central major bank. Corporations within each keiretsu do most of
their business with other corporations within their own keiretsu. For example, in 1985, 51 percent
of all capital borrowed by Sumitomo Metal Industries came from its top ten shareholders, all
members of the Sumitomo keiretsu. For an excellent and objective review of the Japanese
keiretsu, see Michael L. Gerlach, Twilight of the Keiretsu? A Critical Assessment, 18 J. JAPA-
NESE STUD. 79 (1992). The keiretsu has been viciously attacked by corporate America and the
United States media as a major barrier to American corporations doing business in Japan.
The parallels to the zaibatsu, or "family conglomerate corporation" - which were abolished
during the United States's occupation of Japan after World War II - are quite striking. The
zaibatsu were individual family-owned and -controlled conglomerates that existed from the Meiji
Era (1868-1912) until the end of World War 1I. There were many zaibatsu, but the top four
included Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda. At the end of World War 11, all of the
zaibatsu were abolished and purged due to their role in arming Japan and facilitating the war
effort. After the United States's occupation, these corporate groups reformed into what are now
the keiretsu. Keiretsu differ from zaibatsu in that keiretsu are not owned or controlled by one
single family and in that the individual companies that make up each keiretsu have much more
autonomy. DOROTHY PERKINS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPAN: JAPANESE HISTORY AND CULTURE,
FROM ABACUS TO ZORI 391 (1991).
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Coca-Cola, KFC, 7-11, and McDonald's, to name a few) have suc-
ceeded in Japan, how poor decision-making by corporate America
has caused American companies to fail in Japan,5 how Japanese
thinking and decision-making is really the enlightened way, and how
Americans too could succeed if they would only adopt Japanese-
style management techniques.
Taken to their extremes, both the Japan basher and the Japan
sympathizer are misguided. Japan bashing focuses on stereotypes
that may or may not be based on reality, while Japan sympathizers
fail to recognize that Japanese systems and structures are culturally
based and would not work in toto in other settings.6 In teaching
Japanese law, an attempt should therefore be made to avoid either
of these two extremes; rather, the class should be taught from an
objective perspective. Otherwise, the subject's incredible potential
for a provocative reading, analysis, and discussion of the role of law
in any given society would be wasted.
I. OBJECTIVES OF A JAPANESE LAW COURSE
Japanese law is, ideally, a general course offered and designed for
the non-Japanese speaker with little or no background in Japanese
traditions or systems.1 The first objective of a course in Japanese
law is to raise student consciousness. The mass media, which serves
as the general source of information regarding Japan for most law
students, paints a picture of the Japanese legal system as either so
5. For example, a story is commonly told that A&W Root Beer tried to set up drive-in restau-
rants in Japan during the 1960s, when few people in Japan had cars. Not surprisingly, the drive-
ins did not prosper. This story is used to illustrate poor decision-making by U.S. corporations due
to their ignorance of local customs and habits and their mistaken assumption that a product will
sell merely because it has sold in the United States. In attempting to confirm this story, I con-
tacted the public relations department at A&W Root Beer. I was told that no one there could
remember such an attempt by the company and that they did not have the "historical records"
available to confirm or deny it. Telephone Conversation with Mary Owens, public relations officer,
A&W Restaurants, Inc. (July 27, 1993).
6. That is, of course, not to say that the theories of each camp are not helpful to a greater
understanding of Japan and Japanese law. See John 0. Haley, Lessons from a Changing Japan, 2
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1993) (stating that a shared belief in family and community enables
the Japanese to work hard, cooperate, and compete in order to improve themselves and their
neighbors, and that this attitude results in a lower crime rate and a generally happier existence).
7. First, it should be noted that the Japan specialist may and should take the course, but since
there are relatively few Japan specialists in American law schools, they should play a supportive
role in the general instruction. Although the specialists should be encouraged to pursue their study
through seminars or independent studies, a general Japanese law course should draw on their
knowledge by having them make subject-specific presentations; this would allow other students to
pursue topics that interest them on a deeper level than would otherwise be possible.
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dysfunctional that its basic legitimacy is implicitly questioned, 8 or in
utopian terms that Americans should emulate. 9 Neither picture, of
8. See, e.g., James Sterngold, Japan's Rigged Casino, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1992, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 24, 48 [hereinafter Sterngold, Rigged Casino] (implying that the Japanese judiciary's
lack of contempt powers leaves it so powerless that successful plaintiffs sometimes resort to hiring
mobsters to help collect their judgments); James Sterngold, Japanese Election: Unconstitutional
But Valid, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1992, § 1, at 10 (illustrating the "vast difference in independence
and authority" between the Japanese Supreme Court and its U.S. counterpart by focusing on the
Japanese Court's refusal to invalidate the subsequent parliamentary elections even though it had
held that Japan's election law violated the principle of proportional representation); Teresa
Watanabe, Victims of a Safe Society; Behind Japan's Low Crime Rate and Civilized Streets is a
Criminal Justice System Criticized as the Most Backward in the Industrialized World, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at Al (noting that the Japanese criminal justice system is condemned as
"the most backward in the civilized world"); 20/20: Japan's Iron Hand (ABC television broad-
cast, July 24, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SCRIPT File (charging that the Japa-
nese criminal justice system operates like those found in the Middle Ages or a dictatorship by
coercing confessions through beatings, denial of phone calls, and denial of bail).
Further challenges to the legitimacy of the Japanese system include U.S. media coverage of the
Japanese election held on July 18, 1993, and the events leading up to this election. According to
some accounts, one would be led to believe that the entire political system (not just the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP")) is a house of cards. See James Sterngold, Japanese Forget
Politeness As Political Wrath Flares, N.Y. TIMES. July 23, 1993, at A2 (discussing the woes of
the Japanese Parliament subsequent to the LDP's ouster from power). Just because Shin
Kanemaru - the deposed leader of the LDP - had apparently taken large sums of cash as bribes
does not necessarily mean that the entire system is illegitimate and should not be taken seriously.
We know that many American politicians have been caught with their hand in the cookie jar, so
to speak, yet that fact does not cause anyone to seriously believe that the underlying American
legal system is illegitimate.
Also, in an apparent attempt to impress and attract clients, some law firms in the United States
are now publishing "newsletters" with regard to doing business in Japan. Some of these newslet-
ters are actually informative, accurate, and of very high quality; some are almost frighteningly
negative in tone. One newsletter claims that Japanese lawyers do not represent the interests of
their clients and implies that they instead represent only the interests of Japan, a complaint so
common it is almost cliche. See The Case Against Arbitration Clauses, JAPAN UPDATE (Law
Offices of Thomas Flannigan, Chicago, III.), July 1993, at 1, 2. In fact, Japan Update, now known
as the Japan Observer, takes bashing the Japanese legal system to the extreme. It claims (not
incorrectly) that arbitration done in Japan must be conducted in the Japanese language, that
Japanese litigation is time-consuming, and that Japanese lawyers try to take advantage of the
legal system to benefit their clients. Id. at 1-2. These are held out as negative aspects of the
Japanese legal system, factors which are supposed to make the Japanese system unfair and illegit-
imate. The absolute ethnocentricity implicit in these statements is truly astounding. That the Jap-
anese language is required in arbitrations in Japan should not surprise anyone; after all, the Japa-
nese language is not allowed in U.S. courts or arbitration proceedings. Furthermore, all good
American attorneys use the legal system to their advantage whenever they can. If they did not, we
would consider them incompetent. Why zealous use of the legal system is bad if done by a Japa-
nese attorney but not by an American attorney confuses me. This example only serves as further
evidence that law students are in desperate need of a legal education which makes it clear that
just because the Japanese legal system is not an American system, it is not illegitimate.
9. Examples of this scenario generally come from the field of business. Notions that Japanese
"quality control circles," "Just-In-Time" management, and other management techniques were
cure-alls for American economic woes were very popular during the 1980s. E.g., Ezey Dar-el, The
"Productivity Option" to Annual Aid From U.S., JERUSALEM POST. Nov. 22, 1991, available in
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course, is absolutely true.
Rather, the Japanese legal system has some elements that appear
to work quite well and others that appear not to work so well. An
examination of these elements should be approached on a sophisti-
cated level with objective analysis and discussion. That is, rather
than being viewed as an esoteric, completely foreign system from
which Americans can learn nothing, the Japanese legal system
should be respected and studied as a modern legitimate system that
is extremely instructive on many topics, including the role of law in
any society.
Therefore, by studying Japanese law, students are able to see fa-
miliar problems that arise in another culture and are dealt with by
generating and applying laws very similar to our own, but with
sometimes unexpected results. Thus, the consciousness of students
regarding law in a global sense is heightened; students will be able
to recognize the basic legitimate principles upon which the Japanese
system is based.
The second objective of teaching Japanese law to American law
students is to make students think in ways they had previously not
considered. For example, how can a modern, legitimate society ac-
cept a Supreme Court ruling that a statute is unconstitutional but
still valid? 10 Why are the Japanese more likely to follow non-bind-
ing guidances from the government" than harsh, binding, rigid
laws? 2 In pursuing answers to these and many other questions, stu-
dents are forced to expand their accepted realms of thought to in-
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT file; Lee Sands, Zero Defect: Get it Right the First Time,
DENVER Bus. J.. Feb. 14, 1992, § 1, at 3; Bruce Stokes, Export Platform, NAT'L J., May 25,
1991, at 1258. See also SHERIDAN M. TATSUNO, CREATED IN JAPAN (1990) (stating that the
Japanese have moved from imitators to innovators and will surpass all others in their innovative
genius); Michael Janofsky, A Corporate Campaign Tries Selling Toyota's U.S. Presence, N.Y.
TIMES. July 21, 1993, at D24 (discussing Toyota's clever advertising campaign emphasizing the
company's expenditures on American parts and employees).
10. Judgment of Nov. 7, 1983 (Tokyo Election Comm'n v. Koshiyama), Saikosai [Supreme
Court], 37 Minshu 1243 (Japan); Judgment of Apr. 14, 1976 (Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture
Election Comm'n), Saikosai [Supreme Court], 30 Minshu 223 (Japan).
11. Better known as gyosei shido, or "administrative guidance." See generally Russell A. Yeo-
man, Administrative Guidance: A Peregrine View, 19 LAW JAPAN 125 (1986) (discussing the
evolution of administrative law in Japan); Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative
Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 923 (1984) (discussing the nature of administrative guidance and judicial review of this
regulatory scheme).
12. See Kenneth L. Port, The Japanese International Law "Revolution": International Human
Rights Law and Its Impact in Japan, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 139, 165-70 (1991) (comparing Japa-
nese acceptance of social welfare rights to their resistance to imposed civil rights).
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clude responses they would not have made before taking the course;
students are forced to recognize that the role of law differs accord-
ing to the social make-up and history of a given people. This is quite
a revelation for most American law students, who are generally edu-
cated to believe that American solutions are the first, best, and only
logical responses to any given problem.
II. WHY SHOULD JAPANESE LAW BE PART OF THE
CURRICULUM?
A. Japanese Law as Comparative Law
Japanese law works exceptionally well as a course in comparative
law. The two generally articulated purposes of comparative law dis-
course are to either learn from foreign laws in order to improve do-
mestic laws, or to learn from foreign laws in the greater pursuit of
knowledge regarding "law" in any society.' 3
Teaching Japanese law as legislative comparative law - studying
Japanese solutions to legal issues that may be adaptable in this or
any other country - is a worthwhile undertaking. Because the soci-
eties of Japan and the U.S. are so culturally distinct, at first blush it
is difficult to see where one could learn anything of value from the
Japanese use of law. That, perhaps, is the most instructive point.
Law in Japan is extremely culture-based; laws that work their in-
tended function in Japan do so because they are closely allied with
cultural values, values which are as much as two thousand years old.
The most effective "law" in Japan is the one that is vague and vol-
untary.' 4 In the debate over whether law structures culture or cul-
ture structures law, 15 it is quite clear that in the Japanese setting,
13. As a course in comparative law, Japanese law also allows for the pursuit of standard com-
parative law inquiries - legislative comparative law (the study of foreign laws aimed at improv-
ing the process and content of new domestic legislation) and theoretical comparative law (the
study of foreign law aimed at improving our understanding of law in general). KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ. 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW: THE FRAMEWORK 44
(Tony Weir trans., 1977). Because Japanese law - based as it is on statutes of Western origin -
reaches outcomes very distinct from those of other legal systems, the study of Japanese law as
theoretical comparative law may have greater returns than a study of it as legislative comparative
law.
14. See generally Port, supra note 12, at 165-70 (comparing Japanese acceptance of social
welfare rights to their resistance to imposed civil rights).
15. See, e.g., Edward Greer, Antonio Gramsci and "Legal Hegemony," in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 304-09 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (arguing that no legal analysis
is complete without a determination of the relationship between law, culture, and social structure).
For a helpful review of literature addressing both Japanese culture and structure, see Annotated
[Vol. 43:643
JAPANESE LAW
the latter holds true.
Japanese law as theoretical comparative law is even more rich in
material. This is because Japanese law does not fit neatly into the
generally accepted confines of comparative law. For example, Kon-
rad Zweigert and Hein K6tz have written that the fundamental pur-
pose of comparative law is functionality;16 that is, "the legal system
of every society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these
problems by quite different means though very often with similar
results."'" Although Zweigert and Kitz are appropriately well-
respected comparativists, the Eurocentricity of their analysis is as-
tounding. In fac t, what makes Japanese law interesting as theoreti-
cal comparative law is the fact that Japan has confronted problems
very similar to those of the West, with very similar Western stat-
utes, and has come to completely distinct results.
For example, much attention has been given lately to America's
attempts to get Japan to enforce its antitrust laws.' However, these
antitrust laws are foreign concepts that were forced upon the Japa-
nese during the Allied Occupation after World War II."9 As a to-
tally foreign concept, it should not be surprising that Japan has been
reluctant to enforce these laws. On the other hand, much of the
current codified Japanese law was based either extensively or in part
on non-Japanese sources.2 Therefore, the mere fact that the anti-
trust law was not of pure Japanese origin would not seem to be a
complete excuse for its nonenforcement. Thus, more issues must be
involved than just the foreign origin of the antitrust law. The Japa-
nese, however, thrive on such dichotomies which appear to leave one
hanging and intellectually unsatisfied. 2'
Bibliography: Japanese Law and Society, 21 LAW JAPAN 219, 220-28 (1988). This does not mean
that I accept entirely or exclusively the Traditionalist's model for describing law in Japan. See
infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (discussing Traditionalist theory).
16. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ. supra note 13, at 25.
17. Id.
18. Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act ("Antimonopoly Act"), Law No. 54, 1947.
See also Andrew Pollack, U.S. Appears to Retreat From Setting Targets to Increase Japan's
Imports, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1993, § 1, at 4 (noting that upcoming talks between the U.S. and
Japan will include discussions about Japan's increased enforcement of its antitrust laws); Teresa
Watanabe, Stacking the Bids in Japan, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1993, at Al (discussing anticompeti-
tive practices in Japan).
19. John 0. Haley, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement: Implications For United States Trade, 18
N. Ky. L. REV. 335, 336-40 (1991) [hereinafter Haley, Antitrust Enforcement].
20. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussing the non-Japanese origin of Japa-
nese laws).
21. Problems, I might add, that have no easy answer; I will therefore not posit any superficial
1994]
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This is also a provocative manner in which to present legal mate-
rial to students and encourage interesting debate as they work
through such problems. This study of the distinct results using very
Western legal regimes makes the analysis of Japanese law as theo-
retical comparative law fascinating.
Another purpose of comparative law is to explore the role of law
through another culture. Toward that end, comparative law analysis
attempts to categorize legal systems into groups. 22 Japanese law has
defied categorization by the best comparative law scholars. In fact,
until recently the Japanese legal system was merely classified as
"one of those Asian systems."2 a Because so much of current statu-
tory Japanese law is heavily based on Western European law, call-
ing Japan's legal system another "Asian system" is misleading.
That did not stop Kurt Ebert from categorizing Japanese law and
Chinese law together as "Far Eastern Law,"2 4 or Ren6 David and
John Brierley from categorizing Japanese law as "Religious and
Tradition Law" under "Laws of the Far East,"2 5 or Zweigert and
K6tz from grouping Japanese law with Chinese law as part of the
"Far Eastern Legal Family. ' 26 The common thread that held Japa-
nese law together with Chinese law was the existence of extra-legal
methods of dispute resolution. 27 The institutionalization of concepts
such as mediation and conciliation made these comparativists skep-
tical regarding whether "law," as Westerners understand the term,
would be given true effect in Japan. For example, David and Brier-
ley question whether Japan has undergone any real change since
World War II and the so-called "Westernization" of its legal sys-
tem.28 They even question whether or not the ideas of law and jus-
tice have become accepted in Japan as the terms are understood in
the West.29
answers here.
22. See generally ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 13 (categorizing all of the world's legal
systems into six families).
23. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (noting instances where writers have lumped
Japanese law together with other Asian legal systems).
24. KURT H. EBERT, RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG: EINFOHRUNG IN DIE GRUNDLAGEN 109-18
(1978).
25. RENt DAVID & JOHN EC. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 534-46 (1985).
26. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 13, at 358.
27. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 25, at 537-38, 543-45.
28. Id. at 540.
29. Id.
[Vol. 43:643
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Therefore, the mere act of attempting to categorize Japanese law
remains one of the more challenging and instructive tasks facing the
comparativist. One thing can be said for certain: because of the
heavy original influence from Chinese law in the sixth century, Eu-
ropean law in the nineteenth century, and American law in the
twentieth century,30 Japanese law certainly stands in a category of
its own and does not fit easily into any of the "Far Eastern
families."
B. Student Demand
In addition to its valuable role in any comparative law curricu-
lum, Japanese law is actually in great demand among students. To
verify this demand, one need only look to the number of students
that enroll in such courses when they are offered. Even when rele-
gated to odd times and odd days, students still enroll in larger-than-
expected numbers.3 '
Part of the large enrollment may be due to the students' perceived
advantage in taking Japanese law. Students, correctly or incorrectly,
believe that taking a course in Japanese law sets them apart from
the other students graduating from law school with an interest in
"international law." One student even went so far as to ask whether
taking Japanese law would help him "psych-out" the Japanese in his
anticipated future business dealings.3 2
C. Japan's Present and Future Role in the World Economy
It should no longer shock anyone to hear that Japan's economy is
the second largest economy in the world, as measured by Gross Do-
30. See Port, supra note 12, at 151-52 (arguing that because Japan has continuously looked
abroad for tools for transformative social change, Japan will now look to the international commu-
nity and international law rather than only to America as the latter's position as a legal, cultural,
and social role model wanes).
31. There were thirty-five students enrolled in my Japanese Law class in the fall of 1992 when
the course was offered on Thursday nights from 7:30-9:30.
32. Of course, a student could take the course for the sole purpose of winning mind-games
against the Japanese in the future. In fact, that may be what the future has in store for us.
However, I would prefer that people think of the subject on a deeper level. A law student does not
learn contract law so that he or she can "psych-out" clients, judges, and other attorneys in the
future; one learns contract law because it is a fundamental statement of how American jurispru-
dence works. Without contract law knowledge, we would say that a person's legal education was
lacking something. This is my perspective on Japanese law. The information or knowledge gained
by students should be used to enrich and enlighten the student's entire career.
1994]
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mestic Product ("GDP").3 3 What is surprising to most is that Ja-
pan's economy is twice the size of Germany's3 4 and that the ten
largest banks in the world (as ranked by deposits) are Japanese.3 5
There are those who believe that by the year 2000, Japan's economy
will be the largest in the world.3 6 Japan is already the world's larg-
est creditor nation, 7 while the United States has become the world's
largest debtor nation. 8 Japan is also now the largest investor in the
United States; the outstanding balance of direct Japanese invest-
ment in the U.S. has reached $96.7 billion - an increase of $3.8
billion during 1992 alone.39 Japan's total investment accounts for 23
percent of all foreign investment in the United States. 0 Meanwhile,
the world's balance of trade continues to tilt in Japan's favor. In
1992, Japan had a trade surplus of nearly $130 billion, $49 billion
of which was with the United States.4'
33. Mario Cuomo, Bush Should Have Visited Japan, N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 14, 1991, at A29;
James D. Robinson III, For a Japanese Equivalent of the Marshall Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1986, § 1, at 27; David E. Sanger, Mourning Fails to Slow Japan's Economy, N.Y. TIMES. Jan.
10, 1989, at DI. There are some reports, however, that China may have overtaken Japan.
Nicholas D. Kristof, Stirring Giant: China's Awakening Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, at
Al.
34. David Crane, Few Signs Japan Set for Role as Global Economic Leader, TORONTO STAR,
Feb. 11, 1992, at C2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT file.
35. DANIEL BURNSTEIN, YEN! JAPAN'S NEW FINANCIAL EMPIRE AND ITS THREAT TO AMERICA
37 (1988).
36. See id.; HERMAN KAHN, THE EMERGING JAPANESE SUPERSTATE: CHALLENGE AND RE-
SPONSE 2 (1970); EZRA F. VOGEL. JAPAN As NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 21 (1979).
With the current recession in Japan and the continued lackluster performance of the Japanese
stock market, this prediction now seems more alarmist than prophetic. See James Sterngold, A
Missed Opportunity in Japan?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1993, § 3, at 13.
37. Japan overtook the United States as the world's leading creditor in 1986. Robinson, supra
note 33, at 27.
38. In fact, the United States's debt now stands at over $2.5 trillion. Japan No. I Foreign
Investor in United States in 1992, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, July 1, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURRNT File [hereinafter Japan Investor]. See also BURNSTEIN, supra note 35,
at 37 (discussing the United States's transformation from a creditor nation to a debtor nation);
Steven R. Weisman, An American in Tokyo, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1992, § 6, at 24 (noting Ja-
pan's increasing surprise and dismay at America's transformation from the world's biggest credi-
tor to the world's largest debtor over the last decade).
39. See Japan Investor, supra note 38.
40. Id.
41. There seems to be some confusion regarding the actual trade deficit figures; the numbers
change depending on the source. See, e.g., Japan Urged to Support U.S. Economic Renewal,
JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE. Mar. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (de-
claring a "record" surplus of $107 billion, $43.6 billion of it with the U.S.); Japan's FY '92 Trade
Surplus at Record Ill Bil. Dlrs., JAPAN EcON. NEWSWIRE. Apr. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURRNT File (citing a total surplus of $111.34 billion, $46.11 billion of it with
the U.S.); Kantor Calls Surplus Reduction Japan's Duty, JAPAN EcON. NEWSWIRE, June 11,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (noting a "current-account surplus"
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As a countermeasure to this developing scenario, the Bush Ad-
ministration pursued the so-called "structural impediments initia-
tive" ("SII").42 The goal of SII was to identify institutional barriers
to access in the Japanese market and then pressure the Japanese to
change or abolish these barriers using essentially all law-based mea-
sures. The initiative was spearheaded by Carla Hills, the U.S. Trade
Representative under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
Ms. Hill was better known in Japan as "Crowbar Carla" for her
aggressive attempts to open the Japanese market.43
Even after all the tough talk and countermeasures implemented
by the United States via SII, the trade imbalance with Japan con-
tinues.44 This seems to indicate that SII was not effective in improv-
ing trade relations with Japan. In fact, SII has more likely only
caused hard feelings among the Japanese, which, of course, harms
future United States-Japan relations. Even if Japan does capitulate
and amend certain laws to allow easier access to Japanese markets
by U.S. goods, there is no evidence that this will do anything but
increase underlying negative feelings by the Japanese regarding the
"American way."
Furthermore, most of East Asia now aggressively pursues a "look-
East" policy.45 Under a "look-East" policy, countries such as Singa-
pore, Korea, and Taiwan - countries which used to look to the
West (particularly the United States) for investment guidance and
influence - are now looking to Japan. Therefore, Japan's economic
total of $117.62 billion, "about 50 billion dollars of trade surplus with the United States"); Ikuji
Nakaya, Tokyo's Concern Shifts From Yen to Trade, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 30, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (noting that the total surplus was $130 bil-
lion, $49 billion of it with the U.S.).
42. See generally BRUCE E. CLUBB, I UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE LAW 247-48 (1991)
(describing the origins of SII). See also Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Current Developments in Japanese
Competition Law: Antimonopoly Act Enforcement Guidelines Resulting From the Structural Im-
pediments Initiative, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 279 (1991) (noting that SII may have some short-term
benefits by helping to avoid a trade war, but that few scholars could argue that it will possibly
result in any significant long-term changes in Japanese competition law).
43. Crowbar Carla Strikes Again, ECONOMIST, July 14, 1990, at 34; Profiles of Some Key
Players at the GATT Talks, REUTERS Bus. REP., Dec. 4, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, ARCHIV File.
44. The February, 1994 trade deficit with Japan was $4.63 billion, and the January figure was
$4.62 billion. Lucinda Harper, Trade Deficit Grew Sharply in February, WALL ST. J., April 20,
1994, at A2.
45. Michael Richardson, A Multiparty Japan Could Send Shockwaves Through Other Asian
States, INT'L HERALD & TRIB., July 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT
File.
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influence is strongly felt and recognized throughout East Asia.46 In
order to do business on a competitive basis in East Asia (not just in
Japan), an American attorney or businessperson must have a work-
ing understanding of the Japanese system. This understanding must
not be just the superficial perception, too often created by the me-
dia, of an illegitimate system that does not work.47 Rather, this un-
derstanding should be of a sophisticated system that is effective in
meeting it own (Japanese) goals. Dismissing the Japanese system
out of hand as unfair or illegitimate because it is different from ours
only creates more opportunities for Japanese companies to succeed.
While Americans are wasting their time bashing Japanese laws and
demanding change, Japanese companies are making further inroads
into U.S. markets. When Toyota came to the United States to sell
automobiles, the company first learned the United States's system
and then followed it; the company did not demand that the United
States change its laws to make it easier for Toyota to sell cars.
The more American attorneys that understand the workings of
the Japanese system, the better equipped they will be when repre-
senting Japanese companies and individuals in the United States as
well as American companies doing business in Japan. Ignorance
dooms one to failure from the start. A course in Japanese law,
therefore, is needed to educate would-be "international" American
attorneys to work in such a complicated world market.
D. Specific Education for Japan Specialists
There is also a greater demand for education by those wishing to
specialize in Japanese law than is generally recognized. Although
there are now a fairly large number of scholars in such subjects as
Japanese literature, the number of Japanese legal scholars or even
specialists in this country is comparatively small. Given the probable
role of such individuals in the future of United States-Japan rela-
tions on all levels, it is peculiar that more education is not Japan-
focused.48
46. Increasingly, Japanese economic influence is being felt elsewhere. See, e.g., Nathanial
Nash, Chile: Japan's Backdoor to the West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1993, at DI (noting that while
Japan's direct investment in the United States fell in the last two years, it increased dramatically
in Chile). One could make the argument, as Nash apparently does, that Japan is carving out an
in-road in "our hemisphere" and generating a separate source of raw materials for Japan.
47. See supra note 8 (citing American media accounts portraying Japan's legal system as
illegitimate).
48. Of the six major universities and colleges in the Chicago area (DePaul University, Loyola
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For these Japan specialists (as well as non-Japan specialists), Jap-
anese law could also be appropriately taught as "foreign law" rather
than "comparative law." That is, many more American attorneys in
the future will be required to understand Japanese law, not on a
comparative basis, but on a working basis to advise and direct out-
bound legal work, as well as to appropriately represent Japanese cli-
ents in the United States."9
Therefore, it is important for American law schools to be able to
anticipate the future needs of the American attorney. To satisfy the
intellectual needs and professional requirements of what is certainly
a growing number of American attorneys, we must equip students
with a general understanding of Japanese law and be prepared to
allow a few to pursue a specialty in Japanese law.
E. Use of Japanese Law as a Pedagogical Tool
Although similar to the above discussion regarding comparative
law analysis, perhaps the best reason to offer such a course is its
value as a pedagogical tool. The possibilities of using Japanese law
as a tool to educate and instruct American law students regarding
law and the role of law are unlimited.
First, the study of Japanese law allows American law students
(many for the first time in their lives) the opportunity to step
outside their Western approach to law and the role of law. In doing
so, the student is confronted with how a society such as Japan deals
with very similar problems and very familiar laws but reaches out-
comes totally unexpected to the American student. For example, Ja-
pan faced a legal problem that has confronted many Western na-
tions as they became more urban and modern: as the population
shifted from rural to urban centers, the value of each rural vote
gradually became more powerful than each urban vote." For de-
University, Northern Illinois University, Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, and
the University of Illinois at Chicago), not one offers an advanced degree in Japanese studies.
49. 1 have been criticized by some of my colleagues for arguing that Japanese law should be
part of the curriculum in American law schools. They say it makes me appear out of touch with
the reality of law school curriculum choices, but I intend no such impression. My point is just that
we need to take Japan seriously; relations with Japan will not improve based on mutual distrust
and misunderstandings. A recent poll indicated that the United States has replaced the Soviet
Union as the number one threat to Japan's national security. Colin Nickerson, U.S., Japan Drift
Dangerously Apart, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 1991, at 1. The objective reality is that American
attorneys need to know more than just U.S. law in order to adequately represent their clients on a
worldwide basis.
50. Recent Developments: Constitutionality of Electoral Districts and Apportionment of Diet
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cades, a compromise in Japan on reapportionment could not be
reached, largely because the LDP's power base was in the rural ar-
eas. Therefore, the LDP was quite understandably reluctant to ap-
prove any significant reapportionment. 5
In response, several Japanese special interest groups, mostly led
by attorney Tadashi Koshiyama, brought lawsuits challenging the
election law's constitutionality. 2 The first cases were dismissed as
presenting political questions in which Japanese courts should not
involve themselves.53 Finally, as the proportion of votes reached a
ratio of 1 to 3.94, the Japanese Supreme Court held that, given the
malapportionment, the election law was unconstitutional; however,
the Court refused to invalidate the prior election results.54 Thus, the
election law was held unconstitutional but valid. 5
Japanese law, therefore, presents a unique study of the role of law
in any given society. If a law can be held unconstitutional yet valid,
Representatives (Prior to 1975 Reapportionment), 9 LAW JAPAN 151, 151-52 (1976) [hereinafter
Recent Developments].
51. This will be a major issue in the immediate future as the LDP tries to reassert its control of
the Japanese Lower House. Although much of the Western media expects immediate change now
that the LDP has lost its majority, it is likely that any reapportionment or other political change
will happen more gradually than expected. It is crucial to realize that in the election of July 18,
1993, the Japanese legislature became even more conservative. See Robert Neff, A New Japan?.
Bus. WK., Aug. 2, 1993, at 38 (stating that the election resulted in "a more thoroughly conserva-
tive Diet than at any time since World War 11").
52. Judgment of Nov. 7, 1986 (Tokyo Election Comm'n v. Koshiyama), Saikosai [Supreme
Court], 37 Minshu 1243 (Japan); Judgment of Feb. 5, 1964 (Ishiyama v. Tokyo Prefecture Elec-
tion Comm'n), Saikosai [Supreme Court], 18 Minshu 270 (Japan).
53. E.g., Judgment of Feb. 5, 1964 (Ishiyama v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Comm'n), Saikosai
[Supreme Court], 18 Minshu 270 (Japan). Interestingly, the Japanese Supreme Court cited
Baker v. Carr as authority for the proposition that courts should not embroil themselves in politi-
cal questions. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961) (holding that an attack on a state's method
of apportionment was a justiciable issue as opposed to a political question).
The Japanese Supreme Court made the transition from refusing to deal with the issue based on
its status as a political question to acknowledging the unconstitutionality of the statute in Judge-
ment of Apr. 14, 1976 (Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm'n), Saikosai [Supreme
Court], 30 Minshu 223 (Japan). The majority still refused, however, to invalidate the election for
fear of disrupting the activities of the legislature. Id. at 226; Recent Developments, supra note 50,
at 151-52.
54. See Judgment of Nov. 7, 1983 (Tokyo Election Comm'n v. Koshiyama), Saikosai [Supreme
Court], 37 Minshu 1243 (Japan).
55. See generally Koji SATO, KENP5 [The Constitution of Japan] 109-11 (1990) (describing
the unconstitutional statute and valid elections). On March 4, 1994, Japan's Upper House finally
passed watered-down, compromise legislation which nonetheless drastically changes the Japanese
election system. Rather than the current multi-seat districts and ludicrous malapportioned dis-
tricts, under the new system the Lower House will consist of 500 seats, 300 of which will be
chosen by singe-seat constituencies and 200 of which will be filled by proportional representation.
William Dawkins & John Burton, Reforms That Sunk Two Premiers Passed, FIN. TIMES, March
5, 1994, at 3.
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but not result in rioting in the streets as an American might expect,
"law" must mean something different to the Japanese than it does
to Americans. The study of this question brings out multiple issues
that compound both the difficulty of the analysis and the texture of
the debate. Students are forced to retreat intellectually to what they
know, to solidify their understanding of it, and, finally, to build on
it. In doing so, they begin questioning the role of law in their own
society. The stark differences and surprising similarities provoke
even more debate and analysis.
The study of Japanese law also provides a unique opportunity to
analyze the role of law in a given society because the current Japa-
nese legal system is a relatively recent institution. Prior to 1868,
Japan was a feudalistic society.56 During the Tokugawa Period
(1603-1868), society was governed by military leaders (shogun)5 7
via a military elite bureaucracy (bakufu),58 and conflict was re-
solved by administrative magistrates.59 Litigants had to travel far to
reach the nearest administrative center, usually in what is present-
day Tokyo,"0 and were therefore required to seek lodging near the
court building. To provide lodging and, at the same time, adminis-
trative assistance in getting one's case before the correct magistrate
or in drafting documents, a cottage industry of inn-keepers sprung
up to supply all of these services. Apparently, these inn-keepers
(kujishi) were the first Japanese attorneys. 61
During the Meiji Restoration (1868-1910), Japan embarked on
an aggressive and quick modernization and Westernization. 2 In do-
ing so, Japan looked to France and Germany - the two enlightened
56. See KAZUO KAWAI, JAPAN'S AMERICAN INTERLUDE 34-36 (1960) (describing Japanese so-
ciety during this time).
57. There is a wealth of material discussing the evolution and role of law throughout the vari-
ous periods of Japan's history. E.g., HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 14-34 (1992); Yoshiro Hiro-
matsu, Tokugawa Law, 14 LAW JAPAN 1 (Dan F. Henderson trans., 1981).
58. For a discussion of the bakufu judiciary and its treatment of law, see Carl Steenstrup, The
Legal System of Japan at the End of the Kamakura Period From the Litigant's Point of View, in
LAW AND THE STATE OF TRADITIONAL EAST ASIA 73 (Brian E. McKnight ed., 1987).
59. See ODA, supra note 57, at 23 (noting that during the Tokugawa Period, the "informal
settlement of disputes . . . by conciliation arranged by local officials or elders was encouraged").
60. Richard W. Rabinowitz, The Historical Development of the Japanese Bar, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 61, 62-63 (1956).
61. See, e.g., I DAN F. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND
MODERN 167 (1965) (stating that the inn-keepers "might be regarded as a predecessor of the
modern Japanese lawyer"); Rabinowitz, supra note 60, at 64 (stating that the inn-keepers "may
properly be regarded as the precursor, in some facets, of the modern lawyer").
62. See, e.g., David & Brierley, supra note 25, at 538 (describing the Meiji era as a "complete
re-shaping of Japanese society").
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societies of the time - for guidance. They used those countries' sys-
tems as models for laws and regulations in effectuating their social
transformation into a modern state.6 3 After enacting civil and com-
mercial codes based on German counterparts, Japan became a tradi-
tional civil law, or "continental," system by 1899.64 During the Al-
lied Occupation, however, Japan adopted a constitution under which
all of Japan's courts of general jurisdiction had the power to review
the constitutionality of statutes,65 and which adopted other indicia
of a common law system. This made Japan the only modern, indus-
trialized country in the world with a mixed common law/civil law
system. Therefore, in studying the elements of each system and ana-
lyzing the successes and failures of the use of law in Japan to effect
social change, students study the role of law from a totally new per-
63. For example, the Japanese Penal Code of 1880 and the Code of Criminal Instruction were
adaptations of French law; the Civil Code of 1898, the Commercial Code of 1893, and the Code
of Civil Procedure had German roots. Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Develop-
ment of Japanese Law, 1868-1961, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCi-
ETY 5-40 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963); Richard W. Rabinowitz, Law and the Social Process
in Japan, 10 TRANSACTIONS ASIATIC SOC'Y JAPAN 11 (1968), reprinted in I LAW AND THE LE-
GAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 284 (John 0. Haley & Dan F. Henderson eds., 1988).
64. See John 0. Haley & Dan F. Henderson, The Reception of Western Law, in I LAW AND
THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 161-63 (John 0. Haley & Dan F. Henderson eds., 1988).
65. There are generally two schools of thought regarding the current Japanese Constitution.
Some believe that the 1947 Constitution was of Japanese origin (especially Article Nine - the
clause renouncing the right to wage war or maintain an army or navy). Others believe that the
constitution - including Article Nine - was imposed by the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers ("SCAP"). Alfred C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan's Legal and Judicial System Under
the Allied Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. 290, 296-300 (1949). While the Japanese legislature -
the Diet - was to enact the reforms, SCAP enforced the Western view through the use of memo-
randa to the Japanese government. While these memoranda were not usually implemented by
statute, they did become government ordinances. These SCAP directives laid the foundation for
the new Constitution, which became effective on May 3, 1947. Instead of suspending the old
Constitution, SCAP allowed it to remain; the new Constitution was, in a purely technical sense, a
revision of the Meiji Constitution. Id. at 294-300; see also Thomas L. Blakemore, Post-war Devel-
opments in Japanese Law, 1947 WisC. L. REV. 632, 637-40 (1947) (implying that the new Japa-
nese Constitution was basically a product of the Diet and public debate). However, it should be
noted that the views of Oppler, Blakemore, and others are probably distorted by the fact that they
were participants in the Allied Occupation and reform. Indeed, the actual process may have been
more directive than the members of SCAP would have preferred. As one commentator noted:
"Despite extensive Japanese participation and the willingness of Oppler and others with similar
sensitivity to listen to and to accept Japanese opinion, the inexorable conclusion is that the legal
reforms were imposed." John 0. Haley, 3 J. JAPANESE STUD. 440, 442 (1977) (reviewing ALFRED
C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK (1976)). The
current and most widely accepted view is that the Allied Occupation imposed the constitution
upon the Japanese people. DELMER M. BROWN, NATIONALISM IN JAPAN: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS 249 (1955); KAWAI, supra note 56, at 51-52; JOHN M. MAKI, JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON
THE CONSTITUTION 78-79 (1980); Port, supra note 12, at 149-50; Robert E. Ward, The Origins of
the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 980, 980-81, 1001-08 (1956).
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spective. After all, rather than building new laws or regulations
based on existing Japanese codes, many of the current Japanese
laws were enacted with disregard for the very Japanese history or
aspects of Japanese culture they were trying to impact. 6 Similarly,
miscommunication by both the Japanese and Americans resulted in
a constitutional document that is not correctly understood.6 7 There-
fore, the student of Japanese law is uniquely able to compare the
efficacy of a law that does not take into consideration the values and
culture in which the law is to operate with an effective law that does
take such values into consideration. 8
These are the general reasons why Japanese law should be offered
in any law school curriculum. First, it is an invaluable tool in any
comparative law setting. Second, student demand is clearly present,
both on a general and a specialized basis. Third, United States law
schools should better equip their students to be active and successful
players in the global economy that has developed. Finally, use of
Japanese law as a pedagogical tool alone should justify its value as a
course in any law school.
III. How TO TEACH JAPANESE LAW
A course entitled "Japanese Law" is quite expansive. An analo-
66. See Haley, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 19 (discussing Japan's reluctance to imple-
ment and enforce antitrust legislation); Ward, supra note 65 (discussing U.S. influence on the
Japanese constitution). Although Japan has yet to amend the 1946 Constitution, there have been
obvious changes in the interpretation of that document that may undermine the intentions of
SCAP. For example, Article Nine of the Constitution of Japan is entitled "Renunciation of War"
and includes the statement that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will
never be maintained." KENPO [Constitution] art. IX (Japan). Yet, Japan today has the third
largest defense budget in the world. See James E. Auer, Article Nine of Japan's Constitution:
From Renunciation of Armed Forces "Forever" to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the
World, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 171 (Spring 1990) (discussing the evolution of Japan's na-
tional defense through court cases and political party positions); Tomosuke Kasuya, Constitu-
tional Transformation and the Ninth Article of the Japanese Constitution, 18 LAw JAPAN I
(Paul S. Taylor trans., 1985) (discussing theories of constitutional transformation and the Japa-
nese response to changing times and conditions since the Allied Occupation).
67. For a discussion of the misunderstandings between the American and Japanese participants
and the ambiguities present in the cross-linguistic, cross-cultural negotiations that led to the new
Japanese Constitution, see KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUIS-
TIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING (1991).
68. These laws, of course, would be laws that come directly from or are codifications of Japa-
nese customs, Confucian ideology, court opinions, village regulations, and family rules. When the
Japanese bakufu in the Tokugawa Period promulgated statutes, they were generally unsuccessful
at changing underlying social practices unless the law conformed to local custom. See DAN F.
HENDERSON. Promulgation of Tokugawa Statutes, in TRADITIONAL AND MODERN LEGAL INSTI-
TUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA 9-10 (David C. Buxbaum ed., 1967).
1994]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
gous problem would be an American law professor finding herself in
Japan about to teach a course called "American Law." The clear
question is: Where does one start? Some institutions, when resources
allow, deal with this problem by offering a single course on a very
focused area of Japanese law, such as business transactions. With-
out having a foundation in Japanese culture and other areas of law,
this would be like teaching land use in an American law school
without teaching first-year property. The focused approached may
work, but only if significant time and energy is spent setting the
stage for the subject matter.
Instead, a general approach to law in Japan seems more appropri-
ate, but it must be narrow enough to allow one basic theme to be
pursued during the semester. Using one theme ties various areas of
Japanese law and culture together and makes for a far more inter-
esting debate.
Toward this end, I adopt the basic stereotype that the Japanese
are not as litigious (or are not as rights-conscious) as Americans.
The course becomes a journey in answering the question of why the
Japanese do not litigate, or why they appear to be less rights-
conscious than Americans. In order to frame this question correctly
and thoroughly analyze it, however, the student must understand a
variety of tenets of Japanese law. Therefore, the course starts out
with a conventional study of Japanese legal history, constitutional
law, administrative law, criminal law, contracts, alternative dispute
resolution, and litigation. The thesis of explaining the Japanese peo-
ple's apparent lack of rights consciousness is developed slowly as
each subject is approached. Background cultural information and
aspects are developed with each subject as needed.
There is one important qualification to the basic question of the
course. I have framed the question as: "Why do the Japanese ap-
pear to be less rights-conscious than Americans?" I use the word
"appear" because the systems are so different that the simple nu-
merical comparisons which are prevalent in popular literature have
very little probative value.69 For example, Japan - which encom-
69. Sam Skinner, the ex-Chief of Staff to President George Bush, spoke at Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law on March 16, 1993. In a direct attack on the evils of having too many lawyers,
Skinner claimed that the ratio of American attorneys to Japanese attorneys was approximately
300 to 1. Sam Skinner, Remarks at Chicago-Kent College of Law (Mar. 16, 1993). Since there
are about 800,000 attorneys in the United States, according to Skinner's figures, that would mean
there are only about 2,700 lawyers in all of Japan. In reality, there are about 90,000 attorneys in
Japan; Skinner underestimated the figure by about thirty-three times. It shocked me that the ex-
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passes approximately the same square area as Montana - has one-
half the population of the U.S.70 but only one-tenth the number of
attorneys,7' one-fourth the per capita crime,72 and a small fraction
of the per capita civil litigation. 7a These numbers appear to indicate
that there is simply less law to practice in Japan because the Japa-
nese are not all that interested in using the law. However, because
the American and Japanese systems are so different, that conclusion
does not necessarily follow. 74
Japanese attorneys are more similar to the British barrister than
the American attorney in that Japanese attorneys generally focus on
litigation rather than on other areas of the law.7 6 On the other hand,
those Japanese citizens with undergraduate degrees in law (an
LL.B.) usually perform the same functions as an American attorney
- from negotiating contracts and drafting documents to initial fil-
ings of lawsuits .7  Therefore, the fact that Japan has one-tenth the
raw number of attorneys of the United States is, by itself,
meaningless.
This aside, four different theories are used to explain why the
Chief of Staff to a President of the United States was so unaware of the real facts regarding
Japan and apparently unconcerned about discerning the truth. The attitude exemplified by Skin-
ner gives a course in Japanese law even greater importance.
70. The estimated population of Japan in 1992 was 124,460,000. 1994 WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS 778 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1993).
71. There are approximately 90,000 attorneys in Japan, compared to about 800,000 in the
United States. See ODA. supra note 57, at Appendix I (citation omitted). The figure of 90,000
includes not only attorneys, but all those engaged in the legal profession and other professions
related to the law. Id.
72. Id. at Appendix 8 (citation omitted).
73. See id. at 87.
74. See id. (noting that making comparisons using pure numbers can be misleading due to the
differences in court systems). In fact, it is even difficult to find consistent numbers on how many
"attorneys" there are in Japan because one has to first define "attorney." Depending upon the
source and definition, there are between 80,000 and 124,000 attorneys in Japan. Compare Marc
Galanter, Pick a Number, Any Number, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 17, 1992, at 26, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURRNT file (stating that Japan has 124,000 attorneys) with ODA, supra note
57, at Appendix I (claiming that the number of Japanese citizens involved in the legal and related
professions, including attorneys, was approximately 90,000 in 1986) (citation omitted).
75. See ODA, supra note 57, at 103 (stating that "Japanese attorneys concentrate on litigation
and matters directly related to it").
76. For example, there were 13,159 attorneys in Japan in 1986. However, Oda claims that
there were also 47,342 tax attorneys, 15,260 judicial scriveners (who draft legal documents),
2,947 patent attorneys, and 1,173 public prosecutors. Id. at Appendix I (citation omitted). For a
discussion of the various legal jobs performed by individuals other than attorneys, see DAN F.
HENDERSON. FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 179-85 (1973); ODA. supra note 57, at 94-110; THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 549-65 (Hideo Tanaka ed.,
1976) [hereinafter JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM].
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Japanese appear to be less rights-conscious than Americans. An un-
derstanding of these four models is necessary in order for the stu-
dent to place Japanese legal scholarship in context.
A. The Traditionalist Theory
The first and, until quite recently, only explanation for why the
Japanese do not litigate was simply that the Japanese are a homoge-
neous people with two thousand years of history, which provides
them with a greater social obligation to avoid confrontation and
pursue harmony." Stated another way, the Japanese simply do not
have an interest in the law or in asserting abstract legal principles,
and they appear to forego rights in order to avoid offending the
party against whom they could file suit.7 8
The role of apology is usually used as an example of the tradition-
alist's view of the role of law in Japan. 79 Apology is as big a part of
77. See TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN No Ho ISHIKI [Japanese Legal Consciousness] 15-
36 (1967) (noting that the Japanese lack consciousness of a legal system and claiming that this
primitive attitude has the ability to protect them and prevents them from using their legal sys-
tem). See also Tetsuya Obuchi, Role of the Court in the Process of Informal Dispute Resolution
in Japan: Traditional and Modern Aspects. With Special Emphasis on In-Court Compromise, 20
LAW JAPAN 74 (1987) (positing that the Japanese reluctance to disrupt social harmony enforces
efforts to compromise, and litigation is thus a last resort); Yosiyuki Noda, Nihon-Jin No Seikaku
To Sono Ho-Kannen [The Character of the Japanese People and Their Conception of Law], 140
Misuzu 2, 14-26 (1971), reprinted in JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 295 (contrast-
ing the Japanese homogeneity of thinking and conception of law with that of the West); Charles
R. Stevens, Japanese Law and the Japanese Legal System: Perspectives for the American Busi-
ness Lawyer, 27 Bus. LAW. 1259, 1272 (1972) (attributing the "paucity of litigation" in Japan to
the "Japanese feeling that relations . . . should be based upon a warm subjective relationship
which can solve every practical problem by mutual compromise and accommodation").
78. This theory is best stated in the Shotoku Constitution. The Shotoku Constitution is attrib-
uted to Prince Shotoku Taishi (573-621), although it was most likely drafted as a tribute to him
some time after his death. David A. Funk, Traditional Japanese Jurisprudence: Justifying Loy-
alty and Law, 17 S.U. L. REV. 171, 178 (1990). Article I of the Shotoku Constitution exemplifies
the Confucian approach to law and society that Traditionalists espouse today. Id. Article I
provides:
Harmony is to be valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honored. All
men are influenced by partisanship, and there are few who are intelligent. Hence
there are some who disobey their lords and fathers, or who maintain feuds with the
neighboring villages. But when those above are harmonious and those below are
friendly, and there is concord in the discussion of business, right views of things spon-
taneously gain acceptance.
Kenpo [Constitution] art. I (Japan).
79. Viewing apology as a consequence of tradition is often discussed in terms of social ordering;
that is, there is an assumed traditional social harmony (wa) that apology seeks to restore. See
Dean J. Gibbons, Law and the Group Ethos in Japan, 3 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 98, 109-20 (1990);
V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Punishment and the Individual in the United States and
Japan, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 301, 304-05 n.7 (1988); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett,
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Japanese law as any code or ruling. Many major civil cases have
been instituted or continued simply because the defendant would not
apologize,80 and many statutes have specific provisions allowing the
judge to grant a remedy requiring the defendant to offer a specific
apology and publish it in the appropriate newspaper.8 1 Apology is
also considered the first step in criminal law; 82 the criminal defend-
ant who readily admits his mistake and apologizes is treated much
more leniently than one who professes innocence regardless of the
truth. 3 Therefore, to the traditionalist, the fact that a simple apol-
ogy can have such an effect is further evidence that the Japanese
litigant is really more interested in mending the problem than in
seeking renumeration for the harm done.
An easy response to the traditionalist is to point to Japanese con-
duct in claiming and protecting intellectual property rights both in
Japan and abroad. For example, since 1985, Japanese companies
have filed for more patents in the United States than American
companies.84 Japanese companies continue to file nearly four times
as many patents in the United States as the next highest foreign
applicant.8 5 If the Japanese were truly not rights-conscious and al-
The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 461, 463 (1986).
80. For example, in 1964 a large class action suit was filed on behalf of injured children against
a manufacturer of thalidomide. During settlement negotiations the plaintiffs "repeatedly re-
quested" the inclusion of an express apology in the settlement agreement. Diary of a Plaintiffs'
Attorneys' Team in the Thalidomide Litigation, 8 LAW JAPAN 136, 183-84 (1975). Similarly,
Japanese plaintiffs demanded an apology for disfigurements caused by pollution released by a
corporation. Judgment of Mar. 20, 1973 (Watanabe v. Chisso K.K.), Chisai [District Court], 15
Hanji 1641 (Japan). The apology was only accepted after a company official swore on his knees
that the compensation would be in good faith. FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
POSTWAR JAPAN 47 (1987). These examples illustrate the theory of John Haley: that apology can
be an end in and of itself as an informal sanction, thus reinforcing the importance of social order-
ing. John 0. Haley, Comment: The Implications of Apology, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 499, 500
(1986).
81. Many statutes have specific provisions granting the judge or appropriate arbiter the power
to require the non-prevailing defendant to publish an apology. See, e.g., Copyright Act, Law No.
48, 1970, as amended, art. 115. There have been no reported cases determining whether such a
published apology would provide a breach of contract cause of action if the defendant subse-
quently continued to infringe or infringed in some other manner.
82. For a discussion of the role of apology in Japanese criminal law, see John 0. Haley, Confes-
sion, Repentance and Absolution, in MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: VICTIMS, OFFENDERS
AND COMMUNITY 195-211 (Martin Wright & Burt Galaway eds., 1989).
83. Id.; Hamilton & Sanders, supra note 79, at 304-05; Tetsuya Obuchi, Role of the Court in
the Process of Informal Dispute Resolution, 20 LAW JAPAN 74, 80 (1987).
84. Patents; Hidden Agenda, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1993, at 100.
85. Japanese companies filed nearly 40,000 patent applications in the United States, compared
to Germany, the next highest foreign applicant, which filed slightly more than 10,000 such appli-
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lowed "harmony" to govern all relations, one would not expect such
aggressive protection of intellectual property both in Japan and
abroad.
B. The Revisionist Theory
The revisionist does not accept the theory that harmony is the
glue that holds Japanese society together and that the Japanese
would rather forego their legal rights than disturb that harmony.
The revisionist believes that the Japanese forego rights not because
they affirmatively want to, but because their system is so inept at
dealing with their case that they are forced to forego these rights.86
To the revisionist, the Japanese system is full of institutional dis-
incentives to prosecuting a lawsuit. First, Japanese cases take a long
time to litigate. Based on the continental, civil law model, trials are
not contiguous events. Rather, a Japanese trial consists of half-day
(sometimes one-half hour) sessions once every month or so, spread
out over a period of years. There is essentially no discovery under
the Japanese system, and plaintiffs therefore tend to use the trial
itself as discovery or to change their legal theory and claim for dam-
ages as the trial progresses.8
In addition, litigation in Japan is extremely expensive. Filing fees
are calculated based on a percentage of the damages claimed in the
complaint. 88 For example, in a case where $400,000 is claimed in
damages, the plaintiff would have to pay the court approximately
$2,000 in filing fees. Although contingency fees are not prohibited
in Japan, they operate differently than those used in the U.S. - in
Japan, the plaintiff must pay a percentage of the claimed damages
to a private attorney as a retainer. 89 To continue with the above
example, where a plaintiff claims damages in the amount of
cations. 1992 ANN. REP. COMM'R PATS. & TRADEMARKS 64.
86. See John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant. 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978).
87. Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understanding the Incidence of Litigation in
Japan: A Structural Analysis, 25 INT'L LAWYER 443, 444-47 (1991). There are no juries in
Japan. Although Japan experimented with juries for a short time during the Taisho Period (1910-
1925), juries were used with decreasing frequency during the militarization of Japan leading up to
World War 11, and they were finally suspended in 1943. See generally ODA, supra note 57, at 77-
79 (discussing the introduction and demise of the Japanese jury system).
88. Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 87, at 453. In 1993, Japan's commercial code was
amended, however, to provide for flat-rate filing fees of 8,700 yen (approximately $80) for share-
holder derivative suits. Eugene Danaher, Products Liability Overhaul; Strict Liability is Coming
to Japan, NAT'L L.J.. Feb. 7, 1994, at 25, 29.
89. Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 87, at 448.
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$400,000, the plaintiff would have to pay out approximately $22,000
in fees before the case could even be filed. Additionally, if the plain-
tiff is successful, the attorney usually charges a success fee based on
the amount of the awarded damages. 90 In the end, the successful
plaintiff may ultimately receive approximately 90 percent of the
claimed damages, rather than the 66 percent a plaintiff would re-
ceive in a typical American-style contingent fee case. However, be-
cause the up-front costs are so high (that is, the amount the plaintiff
has "at risk"), the system appears to deter people from instituting
litigation.
The revisionist also sees much more interest in law itself among
the Japanese than does the traditionalist. Where the traditionalist
sees the low number of lawyers as an indication of the low interest
in law among the Japanese, the revisionist sees it as an artificial
distinction. Law is an undergraduate degree in Japan, and many
people who are not "lawyers" engage in legal work. 91 If one includes
all non-attorneys doing law-related work that would usually be done
by lawyers in the United States, the per capita number of individu-
als involved in the law is much more even. 92 In fact, the ABA re-
cently published an article claiming that there are more "law prov-
iders" in Japan per 10,000 people than in the United States.93
Furthermore, to the revisionist the low number of attorneys in
Japan is not so much an effect as a cause; if there were only more
attorneys, people would be much more willing and interested in as-
serting their rights. However, because only two percent of the appli-
cants each year pass the Japanese bar examination9" and because
90. Id.
91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the role of non-attorneys in the Japa-
nese legal system).
92. See ODA. supra note 57, at 102.
93. Ray August, The Mythical Kingdom of Lawyers: America Doesn't Have 70% of the
Earth's Lawyers, 78 ABA J. 72 (Sept. 1992). August claims that there are 31.71 law providers
per 10,000 people in Japan and 28.45 law providers per 10,000 people in the United States. Id. at
73. These figures, however, are very easily questioned. While it is true that non-lawyers do much
of the law-providing work in Japan, August calculated "law providers" as the total number of
students holding undergraduate law (LL.B.) degrees. He bases his calculation on the inappropri-
ate assumption that all LL.B. holders have gone on to do law-providing work. This is, of course,
an unsustainable assumption without real data to support it. To assume that all Japanese LL.B.
holders are "law providers" misrepresents the data in a manner no different (although in an oppo-
site direction) from Dan Quayle's misrepresentation of data when he said that 70 percent of the
earth's lawyers are American attorneys. Id. at 72.
94. John 0. Haley & Dan F. Henderson, Judges, Procurators, Attorneys and Then Some, in 2
LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 225, 231, 233 (John 0. Haley & Dan F. Henderson eds.,
1988).
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there is a virtual lock on the number of new admissions each year
(about 550),11 Japanese people forego their rights not because they
want to, but because they have no choice.
One of the more extreme examples of a revisionist is James
Sterngold of the New York Times. Positing yet another weakness of
the Japanese legal system, Sterngold believes that because Japanese
courts lack contempt power, they are powerless to enforce their
judgments.96 According to Sterngold, successful Japanese litigants
must find alternative ways of collecting judgments. To do this,
Sterngold believes, the successful Japanese litigant enlists the ser-
vices of the yakuza, or Japanese mob, to collect damage awards for
him.97 If this is true on something other than an isolated basis, it
clearly does represent a system that is broken. There is insufficient
information, however, to determine whether Sterngold's assertions
are true.
According to the revisionists, another reason the Japanese are
forced to forego their legal rights is that there is a negative stigma
associated with being involved in a lawsuit in Japan. Most Japanese
people generally believe that both parties to a lawsuit have somehow
failed in their larger social obligations;98 if the litigants had done
their duty to avoid conflict, no such suit would be necessary. In fact,
it is not unusual for a Japanese person to be ostracized from his or
her community or neighborhood for simply being involved in a law-
suit - especially a criminal case. 99
Professor John Haley recently published a book, Authority With-
out Power,100 that will soon become a classic in this area. It is also
an excellent expression of revisionist thinking on Japanese law. Pro-
fessor Haley argues that at least some aspects of the role of law in
Japan can be explained by the age-old bifurcation of authority and
95. See JOHN 0. HALEY. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX
107, 10-11 (1991). [hereinafter HALEY, WITHOUT POWER].
96. Sterngold, Rigged Casino, supra note 8, at 48 (implying that the Japanese judiciary's lack
of contempt powers leaves it so powerless that successful plaintiffs sometimes resort to hiring
mobsters to help collect their judgments).
97. Id.
98. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 25, at 542-43.
99. This evaluation of litigants may be linked to the proverb which elucidates the Japanese
impression of blame: "kenka ryo seibai," which means "in a quarrel, both parties are to blame."
See Judgment of Jan. 25, 1932 (Osada v. Japan), Daishinoin [Great Court of Judicature], II
Daihan Keishiu I (Japan).
100. See HALEY, WITHOUT POWER, supra note 95.
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power.10 1 As an example, Haley discusses the practice by which
Japanese emperors used to recognize shogun as the supreme na-
tional government. Shogun were essentially large land holders who
consolidated their control by making the remaining land holders, or
daimyo, recognize them either by military force or by economic ne-
cessity. 10 2 These shogun would travel to the Emperor's court, sur-
round his castle with samurai, and request recognition. Until the
Emperor recognized the shogun, a shogun was only a powerful land-
holder; but upon purely symbolic recognition by the Emperor, the
shogun instantly obtained national recognition as the legitimate gov-
ernment. 10 3 Although there were periods in Japanese history where
the Emperor ruled directly, this was the general manner of succes-
sion of governments in pre-Tokugawa Japan.104
The shogun's authority to govern remained with the Emperor,
usually in a geographically-removed castle. Although the authority
was respected and the holder of that authority - the Emperor -
had to recognize the shogun before his government was deemed le-
gitimate, it was an entirely symbolic entity: the Emperor did not
have the power to rule, and the shogun did not have the authority to
rule.'0 5
Japanese courts, Haley argues, act in a similar way. Japanese
courts lack contempt powers, so while a court may issue a judgment,
it lacks the power to enforce it.' 0° The other branches of the Japa-
nese government today rule in much the same manner. Through
gyosei shido, or administrative guidances - suggestions from gov-
ernmental agencies that are not law but are complied with by Japa-
nese corporations and individuals as if they were - the Japanese
government rules with the "authority" - but not the "power" - to
enforce its guidances. 07 Therefore, law becomes a tool used by the
government to build and perhaps shape consensus, but not to coerce
a predetermined outcome. Or, as Haley puts it, "a rule of law by
command without coercion prevails."' 0 8
101. Id. at 33-49.
102. See id. at 33.
103. Id. at 36.
104. Id. at 33-49.
105. See id. at 35-36.
106. Id. at 118.
107. Id. at 160-68.
108. Id. at 200.
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To me, Haley remains a revisionist; 0 9 that is, he believes the Jap-
anese cannot assert their rights against the government or other in-
dividuals because the government is too weak to recognize and en-
force individual rights on a coercive basis. Because law is
consensual, the government cannot issue rigid orders directing com-
pliance; the government lacks such power. Therefore, I presume that
Professor Haley's response to why the Japanese do not litigate
would still be: "Because they can't." The courts have authority to
hear cases but not the power to enforce judgments, and the govern-
ment has the authority to rule but not the power to coerce behavior.
C. The Rationalist Theory
The rationalist believes that the Japanese are less rights-con-
scious, not because their system is broken, but because it works too
well. 110 The rationalist subscribers to the theory that the would-be
Japanese litigant fully understands the likely outcome of the litiga-
tion and instead chooses to settle, confident that he would not fare
substantially better if he litigated the case to judgment."
The primary example offered in support of this position is that
individuals involved in traffic accidents tend not to litigate, but suc-
cessfully settle at amounts equal to or exceeding what they would
have recovered if they had pursued the litigation. 2 If the tradition-
alist is correct, would-be plaintiffs would not assert their rights but
would instead apologize and not pursue recovery, even by way of
settlement. If the revisionist is correct, would-be plaintiffs would
forego asserting their rights because they feel the system is incapa-
ble of compensating their injuries. However, traffic accident victims
- almost exclusively strangers, with no social ties to the wrong-doer
- do assert their rights and recover at least as much as they would
have recovered if they had litigated. 1 To the rationalist, this indi-
cates that the Japanese simply know their system too well and
109. 1 have only respect for Professor Haley and I hope no offense is taken by this
categorization.
110. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and
Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604 (1985) (approaching antitrust law
as a case study in the role of litigation in Japan); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The
Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263
(1989) (using empirical evidence of traffic accident disputes to analyze the behavior of Japanese
litigants).
111. Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 110, at 270-81.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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would rather choose a wealth-maximizing course than waste time
and energy litigating.
D. The Informalist Theory
Finally, the informalist believes that the role of law in Japan is
(obviously) an informal one. 14 Because of this characteristic, the
informalist believes that law is used to suppress people and to dis-
perse social tension, and was generally used to keep the LDP in
power.' 15 Where the traditionalist believes that alternative dispute
resolution techniques aid people in asserting their rights, even while
fulfilling each party's duty to maintain social harmony, the in-
formalist sees alternative dispute resolution as a subterfuge. It was
used by the ruling LDP only to appease the populace and thereby
maintain the LDP's power. Whenever tension over a specific issue
such as pollution arose, the government set up alternative dispute
resolution centers to deal with individual claims. This prevented
people from forming a more powerful group and pressing for greater
rights which might have undermined the LDP's power base.
A primary example cited by informalists as evidence that the law
is used as a subterfuge by those in power is the Minamata pollution
case." 6 When the people in Minamata started getting ill from mer-
cury poisoning, they blamed Chisso, a local chemical company.
However, because they could not establish a clear causal link, the
company offered only small amounts of compensation as sympathy
payments." 7 The local and regional governments then established
mediation committees in an attempt to settle the dispute."' These
were also largely ineffective in compensating victims because no one
could establish the causal link required by law." 9 Finally, the vic-
tims formed a group to prosecute their claims against Chisso. As
public opinion in favor of the group gained momentum, the judges
in the case relaxed the causal requirement to allow for compensa-
tion.' 2 ' Although victorious, the Minamata victims were not satis-
fied until Chisso's president personally and sincerely apologized and
114. E.g., UPH-AM, supra note 80, at 166.
115. Id. at 28-30; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing how the LDP has
subsequently lost its majority power in the government).
116. See UPHAM, supra note 80, at 30-77.
117. Id. at 31-32.
118. Id. at 32.
119. Id. at 32-34.
120. Id. at 45-46.
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accepted responsibility for his company's crimes.12 1
Only when it was clear that Chisso was going to lose did the gov-
ernment become more sympathetic toward the Minamata victims
and their claims. According to the informalists, if the group had not
been formed and public opinion had not swayed in its favor, the
LDP would have continued to support Chisso and resist any notions
of change. The individuals would have remained uncompensated,
and the pollution would have continued unabated. It was only be-
cause the group was also able to take advantage of the informal
nature of Japanese law that the individual victims were able to
recover.
The above models are presented for their edification value, not in
an effort to choose which is correct. In fact, each one is correct to a
certain extent. Although each is framed by its proponents as mutu-
ally exclusive, the Western concept of mutual exclusivity is not prev-
alent in Japan. This is where the student is left as the course wraps
up. By this indirect route, he has learned that the Japanese do not
mind dichotomies; in fact, the Japanese revel in dichotomies which
foil Westerners.' If we often do not understand a Japanese dichot-
omy, it only proves to the Japanese that they are somehow uniquely
unique - impossible to understand by foreigners.
However, these dichotomies are not that problematic; it simply
takes time and depth of study. At some point, one realizes that there
cannot be one mutually exclusive answer. In fact, the answer may
not be any of the above. Further study is most certainly required to
establish one rational theory that explains why Japan is apparently
not rights-conscious. As one Zen master once said, the world is not
how one sees it; neither is it any different.
IV. CONCLUSION
Japanese law can and should be a serious course offered in law
school curricula. The study of Japanese law provides a unique op-
portunity for students to step outside their own system and study the
role of law in a modern industrialized nation - a nation that has
only recently adopted modern notions of jurisprudence. If the goal
121. Id. at 47.
122. That is, the Japanese may have a greater ability to deal with ambiguity. See Wagatsuma
& Rosett, supra note 79, at 464-66. In fact, it is my opinion that the Japanese thrive on ambigu-
ity. It is their apparent obsession with detail, yet fascination with ambiguity, that proves very
frustrating for Americans trying to do business in Japan.
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of law is to effect transformative social change, this would be a good
starting point to understand the role of law in any society.
More importantly, however, the study of Japanese law in and of
itself is not as important for the average American law student as
the experience of understanding and explaining a system different
from her own. This experience enriches the student and better
equips her for analysis and discussion of her own system. Once a
student studies how culture-bound law is in Japan, it is a simple
next step to inquire into the reasons for why law developed as it did
in America.

